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New Perspectives on the Ethics of
Switching Sides*
ETHICS OF SWITCHING SIDES - I
John Powers Crowley**
Lawyers who have been in private practice are well aware of the
significance of the problem that we are addressing today-the is-
sues that face people who go from public service to private practice
or vice versa. For those of you who have not studied professional
responsibility, let me outline the main ethical issues involved in this
area.
Canon 9 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
("Model Code") states that a lawyer should avoid even the appear-
ance of impropriety.' Interpretation of that somewhat vague
phrase will be one of the topics of today's discussion. Another im-
portant issue for consideration is that of confidentiality.2 A lawyer
is required to keep a client's confidences and secrets even after the
lawyer has ceased representing the client. The issue of conflicts of
interest will also be addressed. A lawyer must exercise independ-
ent professional judgment in his or her representation of a client.
This independence might be compromised in certain situations
when the lawyer faces a party who was formerly a client.
Before we move deeper into these specific ethical issues, I wish
to reinforce the reason that our profession maintains stringent ethi-
cal standards. These stringent principles allow the legal profession
* The following is an edited lecture given by Mr. Crowley at the Baker & McKenzie
Foundation Inaugural Lecture Series, Inquiry into Contemporary Problems in Legal
Ethics, Spring 1984, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law. Edited lectures given
by Jill Wine-Banks and William Martin follow Mr. Crowley's remarks. Some
background information has been provided in footnotes by the Editors.
** Partner, Cotsirilos & Crowley, Chicago, Illinois; United States District Court
Judge, Northern District of Illinois, 1976-81; University of Notre Dame; LL.B. 1960,
DePaul University; LL.M. 1961, New York University.
1. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1983) ("MODEL
CODE").
2. See MODEL CODE Canon 4 (stating that "[a] Lawyer Should Preserve the Confi-
dences and Secrets of a Client"); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT ("MODEL
RULES") Rule 1.6(a)(1983) (providing that "a lawyer shall not reveal information relat-
ing to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for
disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation").
3. MODEL CODE Canon 5.
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to occupy a unique position in our social fabric and in our republic.
While searching for a statement that would adequately express my
views regarding the status of the bar in our constitutional system, I
turned to the words of George Anastaplo, Professor of Law here at
Loyola University School of Law and a man whom I regard as a
constitutional hero. Professor Anastaplo made the following re-
marks to the Committee on Character and Fitness of the Supreme
Court of Illinois:
I speak of a need to remind the bar of its traditions and to keep
alive the spirit of dignified but determined advocacy and opposi-
tion. This is not only for the good of the bar, of course, but also
because of what the bar means to American republican govern-
ment. The bar when it exercises self-control is in a peculiar posi-
tion to mediate between popular passions and informed and
principled men, thereby upholding republican government. Un-
less there is this mediation, intelligent and responsible govern-
ment is unlikely. The bar, furthermore, is in a peculiar position
to apply to our daily lives the constitutional principles which
nourish for this country its inner life. Unless there is this nour-
ishment, a just and humane people is impossible. The bar is, in
short, in a position to train and lead by precept and example the
American people.'
Professor Anastaplo's remarks are as meaningful today as they
were in 1958. As members of the bar, we must set an example for
the American people. The best way to do so is by ethical conduct.
Our focus today is on new perspectives on the ethics of switching
sides. This notion of switching sides arises in various contexts.
One situation is when a lawyer in private practice changes law
firms. This inter-firm movement occurs much more frequently to-
day than it did when I began practicing law in the early 1960's.
Another scenario is when a lawyer in public service leaves the gov-
ernment to return to private practice. A lawyer may move from
the public to the private sector, return to government service, and
then go back to private practice. Finally, the issue of switching
sides may arise when a judge leaves the bench and enters private
practice. Let us explore the problems underlying switching sides.
In recent years we have become more acutely aware of and sen-
sitive to what we call conflicts of interest. This concept was the
subject of judicial attention in an 1878 Supreme Court opinion,
where Justice Swayne observed that while "[i]t is always dangerous
for counsel to undertake to act in regard to the same thing for
4. In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 110 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
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parties whose interests" conflict, such a case merely requires care
and circumspection on the part of the lawyer.' What would moti-
vate Justice Swayne to advise a lawyer to go ahead and represent
parties with diverse interests, as long as he acted with "care and
circumspection"?
Quite simply, in 1878 there was a different perception of the bar.
The legal profession was held in greater esteem by the American
people than it is today. Justice Swayne had a high opinion of the
bar and he believed that, under certain circumstances, one lawyer
could represent diverse parties. Today, we do not allow a lawyer
to represent two clients with adverse interests.6 I think that public
sentiment would concur with this prohibition.
The underlying concept in the representation of any client is
confidentiality.7 Whatever is said to you or disclosed to you by a
client can never be disclosed to anyone else without that client's
authority or permission. Canon 4 of the Model Code very suc-
cinctly expresses this obligation to maintain confidentiality.8
Colleagues have sometimes accused me of being a person who
does not tell my left hand what my right hand is doing. Over the
years I have developed the habit of not talking about any of my
client's affairs in order to avoid talking about something that was
related to me in confidence. And why do lawyers do that? We do
it to foster trust in the attorney-client relationship, thereby encour-
aging people to seek legal advice. Effective representation by coun-
sel, in turn, promotes the goal of full disclosure.
The duty of confidentiality is an ongoing one. Although there
are exceptions in certain circumstances, 9 we must understand that
the lawyer's obligation to maintain a client's confidences continues
after the termination of his or her employment.' ° This obligation
5. Baker v. Humphrey, 101 U.S. 494, 501-02 (1878).
6. See MODEL CODE DR 5-105(A) (lawyer shall decline proffered employment if his
or her exercise of independent professional judgment will be, or is likely to be, adversely
affected by his or her representation of another client; or if it would be likely to involve
him in representing differing interests). However, DR 5-105(C) permits a lawyer to rep-
resent multiple clients if it is obvious that the lawyer can adequately represent each cli-
ent's interest, and if each consents to the representation after full disclosure of the
possible consequences of such representation.
7. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
8. See supra note 2.
9. For example, a lawyer may reveal his client's confidentially expressed intention to
commit a future crime, and the information necessary to prevent the client from commit-
ting the crime. MODEL CODE DR 4-101(C)(3).
10. A lawyer should provide for the protection of his client's confidences and secrets
following the termination of the lawyer's practice, whether the termination is due to disa-
bility, retirement or death. One means of doing so is for the lawyer to provide that the
1985]
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exists whether or not the lawyer's fee has been paid, for we are
after all professionals, not merchants.
Another consideration in the problem of switching sides is the
requirement of independent decision-making. Canon 5 of the
Model Code provides that "a lawyer should exercise independent
professional judgment on behalf of a client."" The Canon serves
to promote the fiduciary relationship that exists between attorney
and client. It assures the client that, contrary to Justice Swayne's
advice to simply act with care and circumspection when represent-
ing diverse interests, the lawyer should not represent diverse inter-
ests. A lawyer must act independently so that the only person or
entity with which he or she is concerned is that client.' 2
An additional element to consider is Canon 9 of the Model
Code, which states that a lawyer should avoid even the appearance
of impropriety.' 3 The purpose of this Canon is to promote public
confidence in our system of justice, as well as to protect the integ-
rity of our profession. 14
Thus, several basic rules have evolved in order to protect the
attorney-client relationship. First, a lawyer cannot simultaneously
represent adverse parties." He or she cannot serve two masters. 6
Another established principle is that a lawyer cannot represent an
adversary of a previous client if the subject matter of the current
representation is "substantially related" to the former representa-
tion. I7 Finally, under certain circumstances, a lawyer's knowledge
of a former client's confidences will be imputed to members of the
client's personal papers be returned to the client, and that the lawyer's papers be deliv-
ered to another lawyer or destroyed. MODEL CODE EC 4-6.
11. MODEL CODE Canon 5.
12. In order to maintain the independence of professional judgment required of mem-
bers of the bar, a lawyer may not accept or continue employment that will adversely
affect his judgment on behalf of a client, or that will dilute his loyalty to a client. MODEL
CODE EC 5-14.
13. MODEL CODE Canon 9.
14. The Connecticut Supreme Court has expressed the view that "[i]ntegrity is the
very breath of justice. Confidence in our law, our courts, and in the administration of
justice is our supreme interest. No practice must be permitted to prevail which invites
towards the administration of justice a doubt or distrust of its integrity." Erwin M. Jen-
nings Co. v. DiGenova, 107 Conn. 491, 499, 141 A. 866, 868 (1928).
15. See MODEL CODE EC 5-15 (an attorney should never represent in litigation mul-
tiple clients with differing interests). Furthermore, since the lawyers within a firm are
usually regarded as a single unit for conflict of interest purposes, different lawyers in the
same firm must not represent adverse parties in a civil case. See MODEL CODE DR 5-
105(A) (lawyer shall decline proffered employment if it would be likely to involve him in
representing different interests).
16. Matthew 6:24.
17. See infra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
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lawyer's new firm, resulting in disqualification of the firm.1 8 Any
time a lawyer attempts to do so, the danger arises that one client's
confidences may be imparted to another. Even if no confidences
are actually shared, the rules help lawyers avoid the appearance of
impropriety.
Let us imagine the following common scenario. A lawyer is an
associate in Firm A, and Firm A represents the Widget Company.
The lawyer leaves Firm A to join Firm B, which represents the Yo-
Yo Company. Yo-Yo wants to sue Widget. Can Firm B be pro-
hibited from representing Yo-Yo because one of its lawyers was
formerly associated with Firm A? The resolution of this question
has become very sophisticated. The analysis involves two consid-
erations. First, is the current representation substantially related
to the former representation so that it is likely that the lawyer pre-
viously has obtained confidential information from Widget which
now may be used to Widget's detriment? Second, if the answer to
the previous inquiry is yes, should the lawyer's knowledge be im-
puted to the other members of the new firm, Firm B?
The first step is to examine the lawyer's position. In the original
representation, confidences and secrets were presumably obtained
from Widget which cannot be used against Widget. Indeed, the
lawyer must not use or disclose that information for any purpose.
But does this prohibit the lawyer from ever assuming any represen-
tation adverse to Widget? The answer to this question revolves
around the likelihood that the lawyer previously received confiden-
tial information that could be used against Widget for the benefit of
the new client, Yo-Yo.
In Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp.,"9 the Seventh
Circuit indicated that substantial relationship "is determined by
asking whether it could reasonably be said that during the former
representation [that] attorney might have acquired information re-
lated to the subject matter of the subsequent representation.' '20
The court noted that disqualification analysis involves three steps.
The trial court must first make a factual reconstruction of the
18. See infra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
19. 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1978).
20. Id. at 225 (quoting Cannon v. United States Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209,
223 (N.D. Ill. 1975), adopted and afld, 532 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1976)).
The substantial relationship test also is applied in the concurrent representation set-
ting. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1322 (7th
Cir.), (court determined that two contrary undertakings by a Chicago-based firm and its
Washington, D.C.-based attorneys, each substantially related to the other, outweighed
the client's interest in continuing with its chosen attorney), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955
(1978).
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scope of the previous legal representation.2' Second, the judge
must determine "whether it is reasonable to infer that the confiden-
tial information allegedly given would have been given to a lawyer
representing a client in those matters. '2 2 Finally, the court must
decide if that information is relevant to the issues raised in the cur-
rent litigation pending against the former client.23
Returning to our scenario, let us assume that our hypothetical
lawyer may be disqualified from the Yo-Yo v. Widget case because
of the possession of confidential knowledge. The next inquiry is
whether there is automatic disqualification of the other 200 mem-
bers of the new law firm. 24 The Model Code incorporates this con-
cept of imputed disqualification. Disciplinary Rule 5-105(D)
provides that "[i]f a lawyer is required to decline employment or to
withdraw from employment under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner
or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm may
accept or continue such employment. ' 25 Although the provision
appears clear on its face, courts have formulated different rules in
order to mitigate the harsh effect of a literal interpretation. Judi-
cial analysis in this area utilizes two presumptions.
First, there is a presumption that an attorney who worked on a
substantially related matter received confidential information.26
This presumption is rebuttable, although a very strict standard of
proof must be applied. 27 The second presumption is that particular
21. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 225 (7th Cir. 1978).
22. Id. One consideration would be the status of the lawyer within the firm. For
example, it is not very likely that a very junior associate in a large firm would have
received confidential information from a client.
23. Id. Relevance is to be measured by the violations alleged in the complaint, and
assessment of the evidence useful in establishing those allegations. Id.
24. For a general discussion of imputed disqualification, see Peterson, Rebuttable Pre-
sumptions and Intra-Firm Screening: The New Seventh Circuit Approach to Vicarious Dis-
qualification of Litigation Counsel, 59 NOTRE DAME LAW. 399 (1984); Note, Attorney
Disqualification: The Case for An Irrebuttable Presumption Rebutted, 44 ALB. L. REV.
645, 650-60 (1980).
25. MODEL CODE DR 5-105(D).
26. If the court finds a substantial relationship between the two matters, then it is
unnecessary for the movant to prove that the lawyer in question actually received during
his former employment confidential information relevant to matters involved in the sub-
sequent representation. LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252, 255 (7th
Cir. 1983); Schloetter v. Railoc of Ind., Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 1976).
27. LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Lake, 673 F.2d 252, 256 (7th Cir. 1983). How-
ever, requiring such a strict standard of proof may result in such a presumption being
akin to an irrebutable one. Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564,
1577 n.19 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Novo Terapeutisk v. Baxter Travenol Lab., 607 F.2d 186,
196-97 (7th Cir. 1979); cf. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221,
223 n.3 (7th Cir. 1978) (inquiry into whether actual confidences were shared between
client and counsel should be avoided whenever a presumption can be utilized); Emle
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lawyers in a law firm share their clients' confidences. 28 This pre-
sumption is clearly rebuttable. 29 Courts have approved the use of a
screening device - a "Chinese wall" - that separates the disquali-
fied attorney from the other lawyers in the firm.30
I would now like to comment briefly on the switch from the
public to the private sector. Although the basic concepts are
analogous to those principles underlying transfers between private
firms, public policy concerns come into play when governmental
matters are involved. One concern is that any information ob-
tained from the government will not be used against the govern-
ment in the future.3' Moreover, the rules must discourage a
government lawyer's handling a particular assignment in such a
way as to encourage prospects of future employment.32 We want
to avoid any possibility that a government lawyer's actions as a
public official might be influenced, or open to a charge of influence,
because of a desire for particular subsequent employment.
These policy considerations have led to federal legislation regu-
lating the practice of former government lawyers.33 A former gov-
ernment lawyer is permanently prohibited from switching sides in
any case in which that lawyer participated personally and substan-
tially while employed by the government. 34 Additionally, for two
years after leaving government service a lawyer may not be in-
volved in any case in which he served in a supervisory capacity in
the year prior to leaving the government. 35 Violation of these pro-
Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973) (inquiry into whether
lawyer received confidential information during previous employment would prove de-
structive of Canon 4 of the Model Code).
28. LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252, 257 (7th Cir. 1983); Novo
Terapeutisk v. Baxter Travenol Lab., 607 F.2d 186, 196 (7th Cir. 1979).
29. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 703 F.2d at 257.
30. See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text for discussion of the Chinese wall
concept.
31. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.11 comment[3].
32. One commentator expresses the view that the most significant risks arising from
post-government service conduct occur during the period of government employment.
Although DR 9-101(B) of the Model Code prevents a former government attorney from
working on a matter with which he or she had dealt directly while in the government, the
rule does not prevent the lawyer from manipulating some matters in order to ingratiate
himself or herself with a potential future employer. Note, The Former Government Attor-
ney and the Code of Professional Responsibility: Insulation or Disqualification?' 26 CATH.
U.L. REV. 402, 406 (1977).
33. See 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1982). Section 207 is one of the provisions of the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1864 (1978), as amended by Pub.
L. No. 96-28, 93 Stat. 76 (1979).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 207(a), (c) (1982).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 207 (b), (c) (1982).
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visions may result in incarceration as well as the imposition of a
fine.36
From the perspective of the former government attorney, strin-
gent restrictions on subsequent private practice are undesirable.
The government is not static; lawyers enter and re-enter govern-
ment service. If a lawyer knew that there would be a complete
prohibition against participating in a particular area of law upon
return to private practice, that lawyer would think long and hard
about entering government service at the outset.
The experience of the first lecturer in this series, Thomas Sulli-
van, illustrates the problem faced by one former government attor-
ney. When Mr. Sullivan left the office of the United States
Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, he was of course
prohibited from handling any cases in private practice that were
pending in the Northern District of Illinois when he was United
States Attorney. But he was confronted with another rule as well.
Since he had held one of the four "super" United States Attorney
positions, 37 he was prohibited from representing anyone against the
United States in any district court in the country for one year after
leaving the Department of Justice. 38 Mr. Sullivan brought a law-
suit challenging that provision;3 9 Chief Judge McGarr struck the
law down. 4° Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari, the
issue was mooted because by that time Mr. Sullivan had served his
one year of exile outside of government service and was allowed to
practice in federal district court.4"
In my view, an overly strict approach to the issue of attorney
36. 18 U.S.C. § 207(c) (1982) (violator shall be fined not more than $10,000 or im-
prisoned for not more than two years, or both).
37. The heads of the four largest offices of United States Attorneys-the Northern
District of Illinois, the Southern District of New York, the Central District of California
and the District of Columbia-are paid under Level IV of the Executive Schedule, 5
U.S.C. § 5315 (1982). The remaining United States Attorneys are paid a lower salary.
Sullivan v. Director, Office of Personnel Management of United States, No. 81 C 3810
(N.D. Ill. Jan 7, 1982) (available on LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist. File).
38. Persons in positions designated under 18 U.S.C. § 207(d)(1)(A) (1982) are auto-
matically restricted from practicing in proceedings involving the entire Department of
Justice for one year after their departure from the agency. Sullivan v. Director, Office of
Personnel Management of United States, No. 81 C. 3810 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 7, 1982) (avail-
able on LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist. File).
39. Sullivan v. Director, Office of Personnel Management of United States No. 81 C
2810, slip op. (N.D. Ill. Jan 7, 1982) (available on LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist. File).
40. Id. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 207(d)(1)(A) as made applicable to the four
executive level United States Attorneys by 18 U.S.C. § 207(c) violated the equal protec-
tion component of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Id. The statute was
declared unconstitutional as it applied to those four United States Attorneys. Id.
41. See Devine, Director Office of Personnel Management v. Sullivan 456 U.S. 986
[Vol. 16
Ethics of Switching Sides
disqualification may lead to the disqualification motion merely be-
coming a means by which a litigant hopes to improve the prospects
of depriving his opponent of competent counsel. Many disqualifi-
cation motions are made with the hope that the next lawyer the
opponent gets will not be quite as good as the first one. Another
reason for limiting the use of such motions is their frequent use for
the purpose of delaying a lawsuit.
My final remarks concern the switch from the judiciary to pri-
vate practice. Judges are also involved in the phenomenon of
switching sides. Justice Cardozo may have presaged that when he
observed that "the great tides and currents which engulf the rest of
men, do not turn aside in their course and pass the judges by."'42
The concern in this area revolves around the impartiality of the
judge. While serving on the bench, a judge may not hear any case
in which the judge's impartiality may reasonably be questioned.43
This certainly would include any case in which the judge's former
firm or a former client was appearing." But once a judge leaves
the bench, the governing standard is "the appearance of impropri-
ety." The Model Code provides that "a lawyer shall not accept
private employment in a matter upon the merits of which he has
acted in a judicial capacity. '45
Upon my departure from the bench and return to private prac-
tice in 1981, I devoted considerable thought to the question of
which clients I could represent. Obviously, I know that I would
not take any case in which I had acted in a judicial capacity, or any
case pending on my calendar. But I also decided that I would re-
fuse to accept any case that was pending in the district court while
(1982). The Court vacated the judgment below, and remanded the case with instructions
to dismiss the cause as moot.
42. B. CARDOzo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (1921).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1982). A judge shall also disqualify himself in specified cir-
cumstances, such as where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party; where
in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or an attorney with
whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning
the matter; and where he knows that he, or his spouse or minor child, has a financial
interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding. 28 U.S.C. §
455(b)(1), (2), (4) (1982), see also ABA CODE OF JUDICAL CONDUCT Canon 3C.(l), 3D.
(1972) (judge should disqualify himself from sitting in any proceeding in which his im-
partiality may reasonably be questioned; however, a judge of a relative in the proceeding
may still hear the case if he discloses the disqualifying facts on the record and the parties
and their lawyers agree in writing that the judge's financial interest is insubstantial or that
his relationship is immaterial).
44. But see ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Informal Op.
1306 (1974) (decision regarding whether or not former associates of judge may appear
before him rests with the judge).
45. MODEL CODE DR 9-101(A).
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I was sitting as a member of that court. This decision was based
upon the possibility that I might have discussed the case with my
colleagues. I felt that even though I might have no conscious rec-
ollection of discussing the particular matter, I might have done so,
and that this could raise the appearance of impropriety.
I would like to share a personal experience regarding the notion
of the appearance of impropriety. Shortly after I left the court,
there was an indictment returned relating to the Teamster pension
fund. My firm was retained to appear before Judge Prentice Mar-
shall in that case on behalf of one of the defendants. I did not
participate in the pension fund case. I felt that I just was not ready
to appear before Judge Marshall. About six or nine months later, I
received in the mail a form letter from Judge Marshall, informing
me that I had been appointed to represent a plaintiff in a Title VII
sex discrimination case. I called Judge Marshall and thanked him
for the appointment, telling him that my firm certainly needed the
business. And he let me know that this was his invitation to ap-
pear in his courtroom. I have since appeared in Judge Marshall's
courtroom, and have appeared before several of the other judges
with whom I had previously sat. I have never found it to be an
impediment, as long as I keep in mind and try to live up to Justice
Black's observation that "undivided allegiance and faithful devoted
service to a client are the prized traditions of the American law-
yer." If we lawyers conduct ourselves in accordance with those tra-
ditions, we will successfully resolve most of our ethical problems.
ETHICS OF SWITCHING SIDES - II
Jill Wine-Banks*
Although it would be much more exciting if I picked apart
something that Judge Crowley told you, I cannot do that because I
agree with just about everything that he said. But perhaps I can
make more real, particularly to students, some of the problems
Judge Crowley discussed which lawyers are likely to encounter
eventually. These problems may now seem rather esoteric, but
they are serious and real problems in the private practice of law.
Because governments change, any rule concerning the revolving
* Solicitor General, State of Illinois; B.S. 1964, University of Illinois; J.D. 1968, Co-
lumbia University. Ms. Wine-Bank was formerly a Watergate Special Prosecutor and
was a partner at Jenner & Block, Chicago, Illinois, at the time of this speech.
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